This article investigates the often cited and dismissed, but rarely examined, rela-
Among the likeliest effects of gay marriage is to take us down a slippery slope to legalized polygamy and "polyamory" (group marriage).
-Stanley Kurtz 1 Anyone else bored to tears with the "slippery slope" arguments against gay marriage? Since few opponents of homosexual unions are brave enough to admit that gay weddings just freak them out, they hide behind the claim that it's an inexorable slide from legalizing gay marriage to having sex with penguins outside JC Penney's.
-Dahlia Lithwick 2
It's only a matter of time before the homosexual agenda in South Africa reaches an even more radical level, as it already has in the U.S.A., where certain groups are seeking to legalize pedophilia, polygamy, and polyandry.
-James Dobson 3 
TRAVERSING THE SLOPE
In the spring of 2008, two remarkable interventions in U.S. family life riveted the mainstream media and the blogosphere. On April 3, authorities raided the Yearning for Zion (YFZ) Ranch in Eldorado, Texas, in what they described as "the largest child-welfare operation in Texas history." The raid on the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints (FLDS) compound founded by Warren Jeffs, the patriarchal leader of the polygamous sect who is serving a prison sentence for compelling a fourteen-year-old girl to marry her nineteen-year-old cousin, was the most dramatic, coercive state offensive against polygamy in more than fifty years. In an action the Texas Supreme Court later declared unjustified, the Lone Star State forcibly took protective custody over hundreds of children, removing them from their mothers and families, despite the absence of any specific complaints of abuse, neglect, or endangerment. Six weeks later, on May 15, 2008 , the California Supreme Court issued an historic decision in favor of same-sex marriage. Strikingly, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Ronald George felt called upon to specify that the ruling "did not affect the Constitutional validity of the existing prohibitions against polygamy and the marriage of close relatives." This caution, like the jeremiad above by Hoover scholar Stanley Kurtz, joins warnings issued by Justice Scalia and other public figures after major judicial victories for gay rights. 4 The Eldorado raid and Chief Justice George's decision associating plural marriage with incest document the extremity of cultural antipathy to polygamy in the United States. Small wonder so many U.S. advocates for same-sex marriage work so hard to distance their cause from the slightest taint of association with it. 5 Most gay-rights advocates and progressive intellectuals reflexively dismiss associations between polygamy and same-sex marriage as rhetorical ruses for homophobia. 6 In doing so, they mistakenly overlook significant questions about the politics of marital diversity that produce these anxieties. Although some legal scholars address the genuine constitutional questions raised by slipperyslope discourse, 7 no sociologists have seriously engaged the relationship between movements to relax the gender and numerical restrictions on civil marriage. Curiously absent from discussions of marital change, moreover, is an acknowledgment that the coexistence of polygamy and same-sex marriage is no longer exclusively hypothetical. Now there is one nation in which both forms of marriage are legal-South Africa.
Post-apartheid South Africa boldly configured its transition to democracy as a laboratory for utopian efforts to promote social justice. Among the least examined of these is its vanguard agenda for family democracy. Not only is the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) the first to ban discrimination on grounds of culture and sexual orientation; it also embraces pluralist definitions of marriage and family. These historic innovations compel courts, citizens, and diverse cultural communities to negotiate contradictions between protection for customary patriarchal prerogatives, on the one hand, and commitments to full gender and sexual equality, on the other. South Africa provides a unique heuristic opportunity, therefore, to scrutinize family debates in the United States from an alternative, and we believe salutary, slant.
Contemporary family politics in South Africa and the United States exhibit antipodal patterns of de jure and de facto support for family diversity generally, and for same-sex marriage and polygamy specifically. South Africa sets the gold standard for vanguard, pluralist family jurisprudence, including legal recognition for both same-sex marriage and polygyny. However, de facto conditions of inequality in South Africa are among the steepest in the world, and an entrenched culture of patriarchal heterosexual domination and virulent homophobia exact severe, sometimes deadly consequences against many who seek to exercise these rights. 8 Directly inverse, the United States leads the world in de facto family diversity. National family history documents a cornucopia of experimentation, including polygamous and same-sex unions. 9 While the State forcibly drove polygyny underground more than a century ago, outlaw communities of fundamentalist Mormon, polygynous families, like the residents of YFZ, persist as open secrets in Utah, Arizona, and adjacent states, while gay and lesbian unions and parenting enjoy increasing national visibility and acceptance. Paradoxically, however, contemporary family jurisprudence in the United States vies for rearguard ideological status among advanced industrial societies, albeit with significant local inconsistencies, because the U.S. Constitution allocates family law to the states. While campaigns for same-sex marriage and couple rights tallied stunning victories in South Africa and Catholic Spain, as well as throughout Western Europe, in Canada and elsewhere, the U.S. government undertook substantial measures to reverse the trend at home, including the Defense of Marriage Act, the Federal Healthy Marriages Initiative, and a proposed Federal Marriage Amendment to the Constitution. As of this writing, only three states have legalized same-sex marriage (and one of these laws is in jeopardy), 10 four states recognize civil unions, but forty-three states have adopted constitutional amendments or legislation to prohibit same-sex marriage. 11 Recently also, after a fifty-year hiatus, two U.S. states initiated criminal prosecutions for bigamy, and a third is rumored to be in the works for some residents of the YFZ compound. 12 These striking national contrasts invite a serious assessment of the slipperyslope argument. On the face of it, of course, Justice Roberts and same-sex marriage proponents in the United States are correct that polygamy and same-sex marriage share little. Their ideologies, constituencies, and historic trajectories are nearly inverted. Historically, polygamy rests on pre-modern, patriarchal, religious principles, while gay marriage derives from late modern transformations of intimacy, propelled by egalitarian, secular impulses. 13 Nonetheless, these seemingly antagonistic kinship formations have come to share some surprising political affinities in the United States. First, both challenge the monolithic definition of monogamous heterosexual marriage that historians have shown to be central to the nation's republican identity.
14 Second, both expose massive gaps between mainstream sexual and familial ideology and widespread intimate practices in the United States. Third, uncomfortable histories of unacknowledged racial codings burden the politics of polygamy as well as same-sex marriage. Finally, the legal fate of both forms of intimacy may prove to be more entwined than either of their constituencies would wish.
Employing a comparative historical analysis of South African and U.S. family jurisprudence, ideology, and cultural politics, we examine relationships between legal and popular support for same-sex marriage and polygamy in the two nations. We investigate whether these divergent alternatives to monogamous, heterosexual marriage share significant social sources, affinities, or fates. Does relaxing gender restrictions on legal marriage necessitate, or at least facilitate, relaxing numerical constraints as well? To address these questions, we compare contrasting genealogies of de jure and de facto support for family diversity in the two societies.
In choosing to compare the United States and South Africa, we heed cautions against superficial comparisons. 15 We do not pretend that their family and social conditions bear much resemblance or that South African legal protections for family diversity could be meaningfully transplanted to the United States in any feasible way. Indeed, we can and at times more readily will make a case for their incommensurability. However, our analysis of the very different histories of polygamy and same-sex marriage in the two societies reveals the centrality of racial politics to marriage regimes in both nations. It likewise leads us to propose paradoxical narratives about the implications of legal same-sex marriage for the future of polygamy in both nations. If there is a slippery marital slope, we argue, it does not tilt in a singular or expected direction. First, we show that, counter-intuitively, in South Africa, legal recognition for polygyny preceded and facilitated legal same-sex marriage, but the latter is likely to undermine the patriarchal practice of the former. In the U.S., in contrast, we demonstrate how criminalizing Mormon polygyny helped plow the trail to contemporary gay marriage demands, rather than the other way round. Nonetheless, as opponents of same-sex marriage claim, legalizing gay marriage can strengthen the case for decriminalizing polygamy, albeit only with significant differences from its current practice.
SOUTH AFRICA: VANGUARD FAMILY PLURALISM DE JURE If one looks only at the black letter of the law, South Africa appears the most egalitarian society in the world. The Founding Provisions of the 1996 Constitution explicitly recognize past injustices and identify human dignity, equality, the advancement of human rights, as well as non-racialism and nonsexism as core values of the new Republic. The expansive equality clause of the Bill of Rights states, "The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnicity or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth." 16 The Bill of Rights protects multiple dimensions of family life. Individuals enjoy explicit freedom to make decisions concerning reproduction, 17 and children acquire extensive rights, including a right to family or parental care. Yet the Constitution also embraces harmonizing diverse cultures and customary traditions. The Bill of Rights specifies that freedom of religion and opinion empower the state to recognize marriages "concluded under any tradition, or system of religious, personal or family law."
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On a practical level, apartheid-era law continues to govern until overturned by court challenges or new legislation, and both are developing rapidly. The South African Law Commission recommended a substantive, rather than a structural, definition of "family member" that "should entrench a non-traditional approach to family relations." 19 The South African Law Commission's White Paper for Social Welfare recognized that families take myriad forms: "The social, religious and cultural diversity of families are acknowledged as well as the effects of social change on the nature and structure of families." 20 The document defined family as "individuals who either by a contract or agreement choose to live together intimately and function as a unit in a social and economic system. The family is the primary social unit which ideally provides care, nurturing, and socialization for its members." 21 Welfare reform proposed a "follow the child" approach to defining parentage, rather than presuming that married, biological parents will fill those roles. One impetus for this was to protect children in polygynous families. 22 Lesbigay family rights. In the new Constitution's first decade, gay and lesbian South Africans garnered stunning new de jure rights and protections. Constitutional challenges consistently succeeded, overturning anti-sodomy laws and winning immigration equality, the right to jointly adopt children, and finally, same-sex marriage. The Court adopted a novel definition of sexual orientation based on erotic attraction 23 and rejected justifications that courts in the Global North use to deny family rights to gay men and lesbians.
The court's early sodomy decision defined protection for sexual orientation to include anyone who "might on a single occasion only be erotically attracted to members of their own sex" or who might choose a homosexual identity, as well as for bisexuals and transsexuals. 24 Justice Ackerman, writing for a unanimous court, ruled that because "gay men are a permanent minority in society, [who] have suffered from patterns of disadvantage," sodomy laws infringe on rights to equality, dignity, and privacy. 25 The commitment to human dignity responds to South Africa's apartheid legacy. By acknowledging "the value and worth of all individuals as members of society," the court underscored parallels between sodomy laws and miscegenation prohibitions.
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South African gay family jurisprudence challenges two popular misconceptions-the belief that homosexuality is primarily about sex and that lesbians and gays cannot procreate and thus have no need to partake in family. The court countered that, "from a legal and constitutional point of view, procreative potential is not a defining characteristic of conjugal relationships."
27 It rejected any connection between excluding same-sex couples from legal benefits and protecting the family lives of heterosexuals, finding gays and lesbians "capable of constituting a family, whether nuclear or extended, and of establishing, enjoying and benefiting from family life which is not distinguishable in any significant respect from heterosexual spouses." 28 The Constitutional Court boldly insisted that Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) citizens deserve respect and support for their relationships whether they are queer by biology, by choice, for a day, or for a lifetime.
This jurisprudence appears to embrace a capacious plurality of family forms and to reject religious justifications for discriminating against LGBT South Africans. Nonetheless, civil marriage remains the gold standard for relationship recognition. In the Home Affairs case, concerning immigration rights for samesex partners, Justice Ackerman used marriage as a proxy for other rights. Under South African common law, marriage creates a "consortium omnis vitae."
. . . an abstraction comprising the totality of a number of rights, duties and advantages accruing to spouses of a marriage. These embrace intangibles, such as loyalty and sympathetic care and affection, concern, as well as the more material needs of life, such as physical care, financial support, the rendering of services in the running of the common household. 29 The court, in another unanimous opinion, held that same-sex unions meet that legal standard and granted them equal immigration rights on this basis.
In December 2005, the Constitutional Court handed down its historic mandate that same-sex couples be granted full marriage rights by the following year's end. Holding the exclusion of LGBT citizens from civil benefits of marriage presumptively unconstitutional, Justice Albee Sachs confirmed that the Constitution protects both the status "sexual orientation" and the conduct of homosexual sex. It deemed gay and lesbian life partners as capable as heterosexual couples of expressing love, providing mutual support, adopting and (in the case of lesbians) bearing children, and building and enjoying "family" life. Acting on this directive, after heated debate, Parliament passed the Civil Union Act in November 2006. Negotiating a delicate compromise between gay activists and religious and cultural conservatives, Parliament reserved the Marriage Act for heterosexual couples, but granted same-sex couples the right to choose between marriage or civil union under the Civil Union Act 30 (though they did include a clause allowing religious and civil officials to "opt out" of conducting ceremonies for same sex couples on moral grounds). A controversial portion of the bill, which would have made domestic partnership status available to both same-and different-sex couples, failed during fraught deliberations. 31 Customary law and polygyny. Constitutional equality protection for sexual orientation sits in uneasy tension with language designed to respect customary family practices, particularly those involving polygyny. 32 The Bill of Rights specifies a distinct right to culture, and the post-apartheid "harmonization" agenda sought to recognize customary marriages while reforming them to protect women. 33 The Constitution established a Commission for Gender Equality to assist courts and legislatures to improve the status of women. These provisions create a thorny paradox, because many customary practices express profoundly patriarchal values. Courts continually struggle to reconcile patriarchal customs with sex-equality principles. 34 The 1998 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA) is the watershed legislation in this area. It aims to ensure the consent of parties (particularly women) and to inject state regulation into customary marriages, defined as "negotiated, celebrated or concluded according to any of the systems of indigenous African customary law which exist in South Africa." 35 The RCMA offers limited recognition under civil law to plural customary marriages and decrees that women in these marriages have full "status and capacity" to possess and dispose of property, enter into contracts, and litigate grievances. 36 The RCMA represents an uneasy compromise between feminist activists who sought to outlaw polygyny and traditional leaders who continue to register dissent about the subjection of traditional practices to new gender equality principles. 37 Although some scholars consider the RCMA an attempt to "replace a patriarchal view of marriage with a partnership view," 38 it subjects rights to plural marriage and to gender equality to limitations. To guard the exclusively monogamous character of civil marriage, it forbids parties in a civil marriage from entering further customary marriages. To promote gender equality, it declares all customary unions after its enactment in community of property but introduces deferential standards for mediating property disputes that arise from pre-existing plural marriages. 39 Few customary marriages are registered with the state, however, and husbands often die intestate. Despite awareness that excluding women from intestate succession violates sex equality, on more than one occasion the Court intimates that the patriarchal legacy of much customary law derives from benign sexual difference, no more offensive than sex-specific bathroom facilities. 40 Some more progressive case law does allow women to occupy traditionally male roles. In Mabena v. Letsaolo, the validity of the marriage hinged on whether mothers could negotiate lobola, a traditionally male undertaking. 41 The judge held the marriage to be valid, despite customary law's failure to contemplate independent female households. In 2004, the Constitutional Court struck down the rule of male primogeniture, holding that this fundamental element of African customary law infringed unconstitutionally on the rights of women. 42 Strikingly, the RCMA explicitly excludes recognition to marriages "concluded in accordance with Hindu, Muslim or other religious rites." In fact, the post-apartheid regime has not yet successfully negotiated a law to recognize Muslim marriages among its substantial Indian and South Asian minorities, largely due to issues concerning their potentially polygynous nature. 43 Apart from accommodating indigenous African marital traditions, the post-apartheid state resists support for plural marriage. For most of the twentieth century, South African civil law refused to recognize even monogamous Muslim marriages due to their "potential" for polygamy, 44 leaving Muslim wives unprotected from exploitation or abandonment. A 1997 case, Ryland v. Edros, was the first to reverse this trend by granting a Muslim wife maintenance payments after a unilateral divorce by her husband. 45 Several ensuing cases awarded damages and support to Muslim widows and divorcees in de facto monogamous unions, 46 leaving open the question of whether civil courts will adjudicate disputes arising from polygynous Muslim marriages.
Finally, the Court refuses to intervene in heterosexual cohabitation cases. In Volks NO v. Robinson, the Court denied the intestate succession claim of a woman who lived with her (monogamous, heterosexual) partner of sixteen years, holding that the Marriage Act does not contemplate nonmarital heterosexual life partnerships, because to do so risks infringing on the rights of indivi duals to control their own property by electing not to enter marital relationships. 47 The
Court acknowledges the danger its judgment poses for poor, illiterate women who are easily exploited by male partners who refuse to marry them but concludes that a liberal interpretation of marriage law is insufficient protection. Instead, it argues, their protection should be addressed through "empowerment" and social policy.
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Despite the new Constitution's commitment to respect traditional customary law, civil law is the dominant system for adjudicating disputes. Legal scholar Marius Pieterse charges that the dual legal regimes represent a proxy for the legal status of the racial groups they most often represent (dominant civil law for whites and subordinate customary law for blacks). 49 Unless couples agree explicitly to apply customary law, courts look to "lifestyle" to determine which legal system should apply. Parties who appear to have a "western" orientation receive civil law; parties with an "African orientation" receive customary law.
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This determination starkly distinguishes the type of relief courts can grant, and as Pieterse argues, racialized class underscores it. African cultural customs predominate in poor, black, rural areas, and courts have imposed customary law on poor blacks, without any indication that they preferred such law. Finally, official customary law lags behind living customary culture, but courts generally treat it as static and monolithic. Ironically, customary law might prove less attuned than civil law to evolving cultural patterns and therefore less equipped to serve its purpose to act as a living, breathing codification of cultural practice.
Unequal Family Prospects De Facto
Post-apartheid South Africa has promulgated the most egalitarian gender, sex, and family jurisprudence ever attempted, but these de jure rights lie beyond the reach of the vast majority of its citizens. Poignantly, the RSA remains among the most unequal societies in the world, and the gap between rich and poor has actually worsened since the fall of apartheid. 51 The new regime had the historical misfortune to assume power in the 1990s during the unlucky conjuncture of global developments that doomed the new government's ambitious, redistributive development goals and mocked its egalitarian family principles.
First, the demise of the Soviet Union enabled neoliberal global capitalism to impose stringent market constraints on economic development strategies. Second, gold forfeited its status as the standard of the international financial system, causing its price to plummet with devastating effects on South African gold mining, a crucial employment area for uneducated blacks. 52 Worse, by the 1990s, the global AIDS epidemic was taking its severest toll on the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. In consequence, sustaining any sort of family life constitutes a formidable challenge for masses of South Africans. Few among the black racial majority possess the wherewithal to access their new constitutional rights.
Despite dramatic transformations in political representation, 53 inequality remains deeply racialized and gendered in South Africa. 54 Southern Africa suffers the world's highest HIV infection rates, and these expose harsh race and gender disparities. By 2005, UN AIDS placed the HIV prevalence rate among South African adults between 16.8 percent and 20 percent, 55 which represented 10 percent of the world's reported cases. 56 The vast majority of South African AIDS victims are black, and women suffer almost twice the infection rates as men. 57 AIDS orphaned more than 1 million, primarily black, South African children by 2003, 58 and experts predicted steady increases in all of these dismal statistics. 59 Contemporary family patterns are decidedly diverse and often innovative, but grim necessity rather than individual choice or newly garnered rights motivates most of the family changes under way. Declining marriage rates index race. In 2001, 54 percent of black African women ages fifteen years and older had never married, compared with 44 percent of colored women, 31 percent of Indian/Asian women, and 25 percent of white women. 60 However, unwed teen pregnancy had "become virtually institutionalized" among black rural South Africans, due to male sexual abuse rather than female agency. 61 The severe double standard of a coercive patriarchal sexual culture also underwrote the disproportionate AIDS burden that black women suffer.
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Apartheid exacerbated male dominance in South Africa, and black women suffered its heaviest abuses. Severe poverty and unemployment in the African "homelands" compelled men to migrate to mines and cities in search of work, leaving behind a sex-ratio imbalance that magnified women's economic dependence and constrained their marital options. Yet lengthy absences from their wives, families, and villages expanded men's sexual freedom and access to multiple partners, including male youth, whom many workers in the singlesex mining communities took as their "boy wives." 63 Women faced great pressure to enter polygynous marriages if they were to marry at all for the crucial, if meager, supplies of housing and co-workers it might provide. 64 Several scholars maintain that the racialized employment, residence, and marriage policies under apartheid deepened and distorted customary patriarchal marriage practices. 65 Historically, polygynous marriages had been relatively rare, but the Transkei Marriage Act of 1978 entrenched polygyny in that region. The first Foreign Minister of Transkei rationalized that "the African is by nature a polygynist." 66 Xhosa men interviewed in an Eastern Cape township in that period justified their philandering in these terms. Gouws argues that colonial authorities and African male elders colluded in codifying a rigid form of "defensive customary law" out of gender and family practices that had been fluid and less detrimental to women. 67 Likewise, scholars have documented occasional practices of same-sex polygamy in traditional African cultures, 68 but insufficient cultural memory of these survived the apartheid era to prompt the Law Commission to entertain including homosexual polygamy among the customary practices protected by the RCMA. 69 Contemporary South African gender, family, and sexuality bear the weighty imprint of its violent colonial history as well as its legacy of patriarchal family arrangements. The vast majority of rapes go unreported, but in 1996 the RSA held unenviable first place for rate of reported rapes among eighty-nine Interpol states. 70 Field research conducted in Soweto and surrounding townships between 1997 and 2000 found that 59 percent of women considered a sexually violent man to be more powerful, 32 percent of male youth did not consider it violence if a man forces a woman he knows to have sex, and almost as many of the female youth agreed. 71 Survey data in the early 1990s reported that 62 percent of women in KwaZulu-Natal believed that their male partners had a right to multiple sexual partners, 49 percent did not believe that women had a right to refuse sex with their partners, and 51 percent stated that asking their partners to use condoms would anger them and risk provoking desertion or violence.
72 Masses of African women as well as men supported polygynist Jacob Zuma, the current ANC presidential heir-apparent when in 2006 he was acquitted of raping a much younger woman whom he knew to be HIV positive. 73 De facto gender and family relations in South Africa bear scant resemblance to the lofty intentions of the equality clause. Nor has the new regime undertaken significant initiatives to reduce the chasm between formal rights and formidable realities. 74 Nonetheless, material conditions, women's resistance, and perhaps symbolic effects of the legal principles seem to be taking a collective toll on the incidence and character of customary and polygynous marriages. Between 1996 and 2001, the percentage of South Africans classified by the Census in customary marriages declined from 12 percent to 10.2 percent. 75 The vast majority of these citizens were black, of course, but the 2001 census also classified 36,775 whites in customary marriages and 1,366 whites in polygamous ones. (The 1996 census did not include a separate category for polygamous marriages.) Likely, most of the unconventional white South Africans in these "customary" and polygamous marriages are women whose presence alone renders such marriages anything but customary. In an emergent form of interracial polygyny, elite black African men convert long-term mistresses of diverse races into plural or sequential wives. Jeri Ngomane, an ANC provincial treasurer and executive mayor of Swazi royal descent, is among the most prominent of this new breed of polygynists. He travels to governmental meetings with his black and white wives jointly on proud display. 76 South Africa's sexual double standard undergirds a continuum of contemporary practices that blur the line between philandering, open marriage, and polygyny.
The racialized character of customary marriage law is its "most embarrassing" feature 77 and challenges the Constitution's commitment to non-racialism. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it did not take long for a white South African to object to black men's racial monopoly on legitimate polygyny. What is surprising, however, is the gender of the first protester. Christina Landman, a University of Pretoria theology professor and member of the conservative Dutch Reformed Church, brands lack of access to polygamy a form of "clear discrimination" against the white minority. 78 More recently two white Christian couples filed suit for the right to practice polygamy as part of their customary Old Testament religion. 79 Arguably, black South African gays and lesbians have a stronger Constitutional basis to press for access to polygamy than do white heterosexuals. White Christian South African marriage traditions have been monogamous for centuries, but during the colonial period, patriarchal African leaders may have suppressed evidence of same-sex polygamy within some traditional black South African cultures. 80 Black lesbians and gays could seek access to polygamy not only under the equality clause but also as a customary practice. They have not done so, nor does an appeal of this sort appear likely.
Instead, securing access to the most basic of their unambiguous de jure rights remains a formidable challenge for most non-white South African gays, lesbians, and trans-people. As sociologist Jacklyn Cock summarizes, "homophobia is intense and widespread in post-apartheid South Africa."
81 Virulent homophobia entwines with brutal patriarchal sexual ideology in contemporary black South African culture. Gangs of youth engage in extensive gay bashing, including "curative" rape of lesbians and occasional homicides, with little fear of prosecution. Zanele Muholi, co-founder of the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW), a support network for black gay women, recorded fifty cases of black lesbians raped in townships because of their sexual orientation. 82 The director of the Triangle Project, the principal LGBT advocacy and social service organization in Cape Town, argues that adopting clothing and behavior typical of a "butch lesbian" or "effeminate male" arouses such violence more than sexual orientation does: "Lesbians who mimic men are seen to be challenging male superiority. Rape and violence against lesbians is common . . . the men who perpetrate such crimes see rape as curative and as an attempt to show women their place in society."
83 "The fact that we have one of the most advanced constitutions," Muholi points out, "has had little impact on mind-sets in townships. Members of our community are celebrating the Constitution, but it is very different in the society." 84 In July of 2007 alone, three separate murders of black lesbians provoked the Joint Working Group (an alliance of LGBT activist organizations across the country) to develop the "070707 Campaign," making antiviolence work on behalf of black lesbians their priority issue. 85 A survey of 2,163 individuals from all races and regions conducted in 1995, just before the new Constitution was adopted, found that 44 percent were opposed to including equal rights for gays in the Constitution, 64 percent opposed equal partner rights for same-sex couples, and 68 percent opposed allowing gays the right to adopt children. 86 Though the Court has now granted these rights, the government has undertaken few initiatives to change such social views. A Human Sciences Research Council survey of 5,000 South Africans over the age of sixteen conducted in 2005 found entrenched disapproval of homosexuality. More than three-quarters of those surveyed claimed that sexual relations between adults of the same gender are "always wrong." 87 Some public figures share the popular prejudice that homosexuality is unAfrican and, like Mugabe in Zimbabwe, actively exploit homophobia for political purposes. For example, Winnie Mandela appealed to homophobia during her trial for kidnap and assault, and her supporters waved banners outside the court announcing, "Homosex is not in black culture." 88 Conservative political and religious groups staged vigorous protests during the parliamentary debate on same-sex marriage in November 2006 to demand revising the Constitution itself to prohibit same-sex marriage rights. 89 Likewise, Trewhela makes a plausible argument that President Mbeki's tragic capitulation to AIDS "denialism" was rooted in an Africanist genre of homophobia. 90 Not only does this anti-colonial discourse deny black gays and lesbians their de jure family rights, but also denialism threatens the survival of most families among South Africa's black racial majority.
UNITED STATES: REARGUARD FAMILY PLURALISM DE JURE
Compared to South Africa, the history of gender, sex, and family equality jurisprudence in the United States is long and conflicted. Where South African law embraces diversity, U.S. law features a singular emphasis on heterosexual, monogamous, civil marriage. Courts proclaim its naturalness to justify suppressing other marital and family forms, particularly plural and same-sex marriage. Heterosexual civil marriage evolved over the last century, however, from racist patriarchal principles to gender and race neutrality. Feminist struggles gradually divested marriage law of male prerogatives, and civil-rights struggles overturned anti-miscegenation laws. Nonetheless, family rights remain splintered along lines of racialized class and geography, and only two state courts have legalized same-sex marriage. 91 To further complicate matters, family law is largely state law and, as such, inconsistent and shifting across state lines. Consequently, federal and state courts and legislatures struggle, often incompatibly, to reconcile the changing realities of American family life with a body of law that is increasingly unable to address them.
U.S. equality jurisprudence is rooted in the same desire to protect "discrete and insular minorities" that infuses South African law, but the U.S. Constitution grants protection to far fewer identity categories. The strict judicial scrutiny applied to race and national origin does not extend to gender or sexual orientation, and minority status itself (or even evidence of discrimination) does not activate equality protections. In the last half-century, successful feminist campaigns divested marriage law of male domination, but gender equality never became a Constitutional mandate. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment was defeated in 1982, and a vigorous backlash continues to roll back earlier feminist gains in reproductive rights and welfare provision. 92 Gender-equality initiatives never dislodged the heterosexual and monogamous presumptions of the marriage system, nor its gatekeeper position for legally recognized relationships. The Supreme Court has found a fundamental right to monogamous heterosexual marriage, but not to family life more generally.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does offer small protections to some family relationships. The Constitution grants individuals, within the right to privacy, freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life. Substantive due process guarantees the right to procreate and assures a biogenetic parent numerous rights. Family jurisprudence buttresses marital relationships that involve childrearing, presuming legitimacy to married co-parents, even in the face of evidence that one parent lacks biogenetic ties to the child. However, state courts battle fiercely over the boundaries of parentage law, particularly when a non-biogenetic parent wishes to activate rights. 93 Courts increasingly navigate paradoxes between the growing prevalence of nonmarital and non-biogenetic parenting at the same time that new DNA testing can determine genetic parentage with unprecedented accuracy. 94 LGBT parents find their rights deeply implicated in these struggles.
Finally, two neoliberal trends toward privatization exacerbate the already unequal access to family rights by class. On the one hand, retrenchment policies shift responsibility for the poor from the state onto families and other private actors. 95 On the other hand, courts have been creating a veritable menu of relationship options for the wealthy. 96 Both trends splinter American family law along racialized class lines in ways surprisingly similar to that of South Africa. Over the past three decades, economic and regulatory components of legal marriage declined, individuals gained freedom to use private law to vary the terms of marriage, and distinct sex-equality jurisprudence granted women autonomy as free-contracting individuals. 97 However, courts increasingly enforce a contract model of "choose-your-own" family law for wealthy (especially male) individuals. All of this places an onerous financial burden on same-sex couples, who are increasingly turning to private law to protect their relationships. 98 At the same time, poor, mostly minority women suffer increased state regulation and fewer options. Many social policies attempt to control their sexuality and fertility, and in the last few years, the federal government actively began to promote heterosexual marriage as a cure-all for social ills. President Bush's Federal Healthy Marriages Initiative pledged $1.5 billion in 2004 to specific programs that aim to promote heterosexual marriage, in part, as a remedy to poverty. 99 Lesbigay family rights. In contrast with South Africa, U.S. family law displays a checkered pattern of gay family rights gains and losses. Because states hold jurisdiction over most family law, gays and lesbians cope with an incoherent, contradictory set of laws, particularly if they relocate across state lines.
Lesbigay family law emerged in the 1970s when a burgeoning gay-rights movement ushered a generation of people out of the closet. The first wave of case law focused on custody issues, as newly out lesbian and gay parents attempted to retain relationships with their children after divorce. Although these pioneers sustained categorically discriminatory defeats, gradually courts began to award visitation or custody to gay parents, but they often imposed restrictions on cohabitation, conduct, or the mere presence of a same-sex romantic partner in the home. During the 1980s, the "immorality" rationale for per se discrimination against gay parents began to wane. Currently, states and courts differ widely in use of a "best-interests-of-the-child" standard or versions of the "nexus rule" (the burden of establishing a nexus between the sexual orientation of the parent and the best interests of the child). Alabama and Florida apply "moral fitness" standards that function much like per se bans on lesbigay parental rights.
At present, only Florida explicitly prohibits gay individuals from adopting children, but several states use indirect measures like cohabitation prohibitions to the same end. 100 Same-sex co-parents generally must apply for second-parent adoptions to secure a legal relationship to their children. However, state laws on second-parent and co-adoption also differ vastly, and law has yet to catch up with the science of assisted reproductive technology (ART). The bedrock principle of legal parentage, "the presumption of legitimacy" (the assumption that a woman's husband is the natural and legal father of any child she bears in wedlock), does not apply to same-sex couples who cannot marry. 101 The AIDS epidemic heightened the urgency of securing rights for gay male couples, and initiatives for partner rights gained momentum in the mid-eighties. However, lesbigay case law and partner initiatives merely chip away at U.S. law's inability to recognize diverse structures of intimacy and care. Little wonder that so much political energy has come to focus on marriage law, which seems to provide a quick fix for legal problems that lesbigay relationships face. Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 Supreme Court decision invalidating same-sex sodomy laws, a watershed event in contemporary U.S. gay-rights jurisprudence, inflamed cultural and legal combat over same-sex marriage. Even though the court expressly limits the holding to non-interference in the private realm of sexual intimacy, Justice Scalia's dissent charged that it paved a "slippery slope" to legal gay marriage, bigamy, bestiality, and the end of all laws based on moral choices. 102 Though gay advocates scoffed at the idea that Lawrence would lead to any broadside changes in family law, as it turned out, Scalia was partly right. With few exceptions, U.S. jurisprudence places little value on sexual selfdetermination. South Africa's commitment to equality across sexual orientation categories enshrines a legal penumbra that protects equal parenting and partner rights for LGBT individuals. The United States is still squabbling over whether gays can parent or sustain intimate relationships, and whether the law should recognize those relationships. Courts alternately deploy or reject analogies to racial equality jurisprudence in gay family-rights cases. Unlike in South Africa, most U.S. courts fail to find the history of discrimination against LGBT Americans grounds for extending protections. Conflicted family law jurisprudence among individual states maintains drastically different standards for relationship recognition and parent status, and LGBT families find themselves awash in a confusing morass of law.
Suppression of Mormon polygamy.
A national commitment to a distinctly white, Western, Christian regime of monogamous, heterosexual marriage undergirds family jurisprudence in the United States. Though the two stories are rarely read in tandem, the history of marriage inequality is inextricably bound up with the legal suppression of Mormon polygamy. 104 A racialized rhetoric of morality and of the naturalness of heterosexual monogamy infuses both plural and gay-marriage jurisprudence.
Mormon polygamy represents an anomaly in Western family history, because Euro-American Christian and Jewish communities abandoned the Old Testament practice of polygyny centuries ago. Western marriage systems have been exclusively and intolerantly monogamous ever since. The conviction that polygamy is un-American is fundamental to national cultural identity. Racism permeates the discourse justifying the harsh measures the U.S. government has taken to eradicate Mormon plural marriage since the practice surfaced in the mid-nineteenth century.
Between 1854 and 1887, Congress passed a series of acts to criminalize bigamy and disenfranchise the Mormon Church and its followers. Practicing plural marriage, historian Nancy Cott suggests, made these white Christians "metaphorically nonwhite" in their opponents' eyes. 105 In 1856, the new Republican Party pledged to extinguish the "twin relics of barbarism," polygamy and slavery. Likewise, in his historic 1878 Reynolds decision finding bigamy a criminal "offense against society," U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Waite denied Mormon polygamy constitutional protection as an exercise of freedom of religion and associated it with "barbaric African and Asiatic practices" that were "odious to the northern and western nations of Europe." 106 Even liberal Supreme Court Justice William Douglas reprised this rhetoric in 1946 when he upheld the conviction of a Mormon polygynous husband under the Mann Act (prohibiting prostitution): "The organization of a community for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western world." 107 A paternalist genre of feminist ideology interlaces with this racially tinged rationale for criminalizing polygamy as un-American. Since the nineteenth century, critics have associated polygamy with male power and sexual promiscuity and portrayed it as antithetical to women's interests. A prominent nineteenthcentury anti-polygamy crusader, the Reverend John W. Mears, condemned Mormon plural marriage as "the manifest degradation of woman" 108 and influenced Justice Waite to portray the practice not only as "patriarchal" but as barbaric as well. 109 Congress funded a home in the nineteenth century to shelter women escaping polygynous marriages. 110 Although few Mormon women sought refuge, the government prosecuted and imprisoned polygynous men, culminating in the infamous Short Creek raid on FLDS communities in 1953 to rescue women and children from the polygynous families the raids disrupted. 111 Today, plural marriage remains illegal in all fifty states. State bigamy offenses range from misdemeanors carrying small monetary fines to felonies mandating imprisonment.
112 Some statutes also forbid a person from cohabiting with a person other than his or her spouse, as well as "aiding and abetting" bigamy by marrying someone one knows to be married to another party. Despite the ubiquity of these laws, prosecutions rarely occurred until recently. 113 Since the Lawrence v. Texas decision, just as Scalia predicted, there is revived interest in the constitutionality of anti-polygamy legislation. 114 The following year, Brian Barnard, a civil-rights attorney, filed suit to overturn Utah's ban on polygamy on behalf of a married couple wishing to enter into a plural marriage with another woman. 115 On May 16, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the conviction of William Holm for bigamy and sexual conduct with a minor, ruling that Lawrence did not expand the fundamental liberty interest in marriage to encompass plural marriage.
116 Chief Justice Christine Durham issued a strong dissent against the bigamy conviction. She pointed to the hypocrisy of confining Lawrence to specific sexual acts and argued that the Court impermissibly codified in law "mere moral disapproval of an excluded group." 117 The predominance of heterosexual, monogamous marriage in U.S. family law is a winner's history. However, this singular model increasingly collides with the reality of family diversity and growing pressure for a broader menu of legal relationship recognition.
Vanguard Family Diversity De Facto
The United States is the richest, most powerful nation in the world but clearly lags in legal recognition for family diversity generally, and for gay family rights and polygamy in particular. When it comes to the lived experience of family diversity, however, the United States has few peers. No society has generated more extensive grassroots movements to transform intimacy than the United States. While family innovations in South Africa reflect largely topdown initiatives on sexual, gender, and children's rights or survival strategies in the face of AIDS and extreme poverty, a great deal of family experimentation in the United States erupted from the bottom up. 118 The United States represents the global vanguard of personal identity politics. From the 1960s through the 1990s, the sexual revolution, the counterculture, the women's movements, and LGBT movements inspired masses to radically transform personal life. Youth rebelled against sexual repression, hypocrisy, and bourgeois propriety; feminists assailed male sexual privilege and coercion, as well as "the feminine mystique" of domesticity;
119 lesbigays rejected "compulsory heterosexuality." 120 Free market developments in contraception and reproductive technology also unhinged the links between sex, love, marriage, procreation, and parenting.
Despite radical changes in timing, meaning, sequence, stability, and substance, marriage remains far more popular in the United States than in South Africa or most European nations or, to be precise, far more prevalent among whites. For in the United States, as in South Africa, the history of marriage is deeply racialized. Slaves were denied the legal right to marry outright, and the Supreme Court did not overturn bans on interracial marriage until 1967. 121 Now that de jure rights to marriage are racially neutral, however, de facto marital status still starkly indexes racialized class privilege in the United States, as in South Africa. Whites are twice as likely as blacks to marry. 122 In the United States, unlike in South Africa, marriage also remains a preserve of explicit sexual privilege. A vigorous backlash against gay rights continues to score victories to encode an exclusively heterosexual definition of marriage in state constitutions and federal statutes. Most recently, in the November 2008 election, voters supported such bans in Florida and Colorado as well as Prop 8 in California. Efforts to restrict gay adoption, fertility services, and parental custody rights have been less successful, but Arizona voters passed an indirect ban on gay adoption or foster parenting in November 2008, and few states grant lesbian and gay parents rights equal to heterosexuals'.
Nonetheless, lesbigay couples and parents have achieved far greater social acceptance in the United States than the reactionary legal landscape implies, certainly greater than in South Africa. In the United States, gay and lesbian couples and their children are almost literally "everywhere," as the slogan boasts. The 2000 Census recorded 1.2 million individuals residing in households headed by same-sex couples in 99 percent of U.S. counties. One in four of these households included children, and 12 to 15 percent of the couples were biracial. 123 Because the Census records relationships only among those who co-reside, these data undercount and provide misleadingly static portraits of de facto lesbian and gay family formations. They miss the creative panoply of intimacy and kinship arrangements that anthropologist Kath Weston termed "families we choose." 124 The United States remains the global epicenter of social initiatives for planned lesbian and gay parenting, including commercial sperm banks, assisted reproduction centers, and adoption agencies and lawyers devoted to serving them. Gay community groups, national organizations, the Internet and the private sector sponsor "maybe baby" groups, parent support groups, play groups, camps, social events, and vacations for their children and families. 125 However, in the United States, as in South Africa, educated, white lesbians and gays disproportionately promote and profit from campaigns for same-sex marriage and gay family rights, as gays of color repeatedly complain. 126 Gays and lesbians of color in the United States are much more organized than in South Africa, with race-specific advocacy organizations, social networks, and institutions, such as the National Black Lesbian and Gay Leadership Organization, LLEGO (a Latino gay organization), the Gay Asian-Pacific Alliance, as well as the primarily black gay Unity Fellowship Church, a national black gay party circuit, and Encuentro (an HIV and substance-abuse prevention program for Latino gay and bisexual men). These groups rarely mobilize for same-sex marriage or gay family rights. In the United States, as in Africa, many people of color consider gay to be an immoral white identity, alien to their cultures. 127 Moreover, national survey data report stronger opposition to same-sex marriage among blacks than whites. 128 Gay family rights can seem a white bourgeois agenda to the less-privileged constituencies addressed by gay activists of color. 129 Nonetheless, only a comatose resident of the United States can avoid encountering ubiquitous, increasingly positive, multiracial images of gay familial relationships. Whether projected onto the silver or the electronic screen, broadcast on airwaves or into earphones, plastered on billboards or magazine racks, advertised in classified pages, or celebrated in wedding announcements in the New York Times, images of gay family life now saturate U.S. popular culture. To be sure, serious hostility, harassment, rape, violence, and even homicide against gays also persist, sometimes directly in response to such exposure. And, of course, rightwing forces have successfully mobilized vigorous backlash sentiment against the specter of same-sex marriage to pass the Defense of Marriage Act and the rash of "baby DOMAs," including the recent Proposition 8 in California. Still, gays and lesbians have achieved major gains in public acceptance. Popular opposition to gay relationships is certainly less widespread in the United States than in South Africa and seems to be waning at a rapid pace. National Opinion Research Center poll data show an 18 percent decrease in the percentage of Americans who believe that "homosexual relations are always wrong," from 73 percent in 1973 to 55 percent in 2002. 130 A 2006 national Gallup Poll found 58 percent of adults opposed to "extending marriage to include same-sex couples" and 39 percent in favor. 131 More significant, younger cohorts consistently express majority support for same-sex marriage and gay rights generally, suggesting favorable long-term prospects. 132 "Such a day of social acceptance will never come for polygamists," a prominent law professor predicted in 2004. "It is unlikely that any network is going to air The Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy or add a polygamist twist to Everyone Loves Raymond."
133 National antipathy to polygamy in the United States is so robust that few would have challenged Turley's prophecy at the time. Indeed, 92 percent of Americans surveyed in a 2005 Gallup Poll viewed polygamy as "morally unacceptable." 134 Remarkably, however, less than a year after this survey, U.S. cable TV channel HBO debuted just such a series. Big Love sympathetically portrays a Mormon husband and his three wives navigating the emotional, sexual, and social complexities of their closeted polygamous family life in suburban Utah.
Because polygamy is illegal in the United States, unlike in South Africa, the practice has been driven underground where it survives in fundamentalist Mormon outlaw communities clustered around the border of Utah and Arizona. Scholars estimate a population of between 11,000 and 50,000 members of Mormon offshoots like the FLDS, the splinter group of the Latter Day Saints, which rejected as heresy the church's 1890 pragmatic decision to repudiate polygamy. 135 A smaller number of non-Mormon, self-described "Christian polygamists" also believe that the Old Testament mandates patriarchal polygyny ("The Principle"). In addition, a newer network of non-Mormon Christians advocates a radical system of plural marriage that might pass muster under the South African equality clause. The organization called Liberated Christians distinguishes its sex-egalitarian ideology of voluntary polygamy from patriarchal, biblical versions of Christian polygyny. Putting a religious spin on the secular New Age, free-love ideology of polyamory, Liberated Christians interpret the New Testament to provide support for plural husbands as well as plural wives. 136 Similarly, Unitarian Universalists for Polyamory Awareness (UUPA) promotes "the philosophy and practice of loving or relating intimately to more than one other person at a time with honesty and integrity." 137 UUPA advocates for "any form of family structure, whether monogamous or multi-partner, which is characterized by free and responsible choice, mutual consent of all involved, and sincere adherence to personal philosophical values."
138 Unlike the FLDS, polyamorists do not inhabit separatist communities and may not even cohabit with more than one mate. They are less likely to attract prosecution under antibigamy statutes.
Negative political repercussions from the Short Creek raids dampened the government's appetite for prosecuting polygynists. 139 After the 1953 raid, a halfcentury passed before the state again took legal action. By driving polygyny underground, however, the United States enabled patriarchal sexual abuses to proliferate unregulated. Dictatorial, self-proclaimed prophets, like convicted former FBI fugitive Warren Jeffs, likely the model for the sinister prophet portrayed in Big Love, have been able to rule renegade communities with impunity. Former wives and children who flee these sects populate most anti-polygamy groups, like Tapestry Against Polygamy, which publicizes abuses and the hypocrisy of officials who fail to prosecute polygynists. Perhaps this contributed to the FBI's decision to include FLDS leader Jeffs along with Osama bin Laden on its 2006 list of Ten Most Wanted Fugitives and to the recent events in Texas.
Currently, political conflicts over polygamy and same-sex marriage intermingle in the culture wars over "family values," although these are unlikely, mutually suspicious, political bedfellows. Both forms of marriage signify promiscuity to conservative opponents. 140 In the 1946 Cleveland decision, even liberal Justice Douglas called polygamous households "a notorious example of promiscuity." 141 Similarly, in direct contrast with queer critics who view the demand for gay marriage as a conservative bid to assimilate into a suspect regime of bourgeois propriety, 142 conservatives fear that gay marriage will subvert that regime. Kurtz, for example, warns that, "Up to now, with all the changes in marriage, the one thing we've been sure of is that marriage means monogamy. Gay marriage will break that connection. It will do this by itself, and by leading to polygamy and polyamory. What lies beyond gay marriage is no marriage at all." 143 Kurtz believes that sympathetic treatment of polygamy on Big Love, a program conceived and produced by a gay male couple, as he unfailingly underscores, will undermine cultural taboos and foster support for pluralist definitions of marriage and family that South African law embraces but U.S. law and Kurtz oppose.
144 "At the heart of the show," Kurtz worries, is the claim "that, so long as people love each other, family structure doesn't matter."
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He has grounds for this fear. Although fictional and parodic, the wellresearched TV series has revived national conversation about polygamy in the United States. Pro-polygamists enthuse that "the topic of polygamy thereby exploded in the public marketplace."
146 Contributors to national media, websites, and blogs now deliberate the pros and cons of polygamy, 147 and libertarians, like New York Times columnist John Tierney, mock the cultural hypocrisy of laws that criminalize it: "Polygamy isn't necessarily worse than the current American alternative: serial monogamy." 148 While sympathetic to its subject, Big Love refrains from glamorizing the lot of a polygynous husband or his wives. It also exposes practices of incest, sexual abuse, and patriarchal exploitation within fundamentalist polygamist communities. Nonetheless, the program does draw connections between discrimination against same-sex and plural marriage. Real-life fundamentalist Mormon proponents of polygyny echo this view and credit the program with reporting "around the world" their conviction that "polygamy rights is the next civil rights battle." 149 In August 2006, Principle Voices organized a pro-polygamy rally in Salt Lake City at which youth from polygynous families sounded like children of gay parents when they spoke of the pain they suffer concealing their parents' non-normative marriages.
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Recently a few mainstream voices have dared to call for decriminalizing polygamy. One of these, David Zolman, is a Republican former Utah state representative who also advocates issuing a state apology for the raids on Short Creek. 151 Utah Supreme Court Chief Justice Christine Durham's dissenting opinion in the 2006 Holms case noted the state's inconsistency in upholding his conviction for bigamy while it does not prosecute cohabitants. 152 Libertarians note the hypocrisy of anti-bigamy laws in the context of legal cohabitation and men who procreate with more than one woman. As one observed, "Green is not being punished for having children with several different women. He is being punished for sticking around." 153 However, Utah House Speaker Marty Stephens warns that tampering with anti-polygamy laws could "open up a Pandora's Box." This Pandora reverses the conventional slippery-slope argument: "If we are going to argue people ought to be able to marry who they want and have plural marriage, how different is that from saying you ought to allow homosexual marriages?" 154 Vicky Prunty, Director of Tapestry Against Polygamy, labels Latter Day Saints leaders who protest gay marriage "shamefully hypocritical" for failing to mobilize against polygamy. "Let there be no mistake: Passing a marriage amendment to stop gay marriages or any other form of marriage including polygamy is putting false hopes in a bogus amendment. Polygamy has been illegal for decades while some of the strongest proponents of the [heterosexual] marriage amendment are our nation's gravest enablers of polygamy." 155 Finally, in stark contrast with South Africa, the primary constituencies of polygamy and polyamory in the United States are white. Despite its "metaphorically nonwhite" history, fundamentalist Mormon doctrine is white supremacist, portraying blacks as tainted descendants of Cain and Ham (a doctrine the Latter Day Saints did not repudiate until 1978). FLDS patriarch Jeffs warned followers against interracial relationships and contended that blacks "are low in their habits, wild and seemingly deprived of nearly all the blessings of the intelligence that is generally bestowed upon mankind." 156 Likewise, while proponents of same-sex marriage in both countries claim racially diverse constituencies, gay critics underscore the implicit whiteness of the gay marriage project itself. Kenyon Farrow argues that proponents of gay marriage employ the same family values rhetoric and skewed social science methodology that for decades served to stigmatize black families in the United States by positioning the heterosexual, dyadic, marital union as the sole socially and psychologically healthy model for contemporary family life. Instead of reaching toward a model of family that might both secure protection and acceptance for all conjugal and care relationships, Farrow says, the gay-marriage fight places blacks in the crosshairs of an ideological battle between white conservatives and white gays and lesbians. 157 His critique proved prescient in the wake of the historic 2008 presidential election, when media reports linking the high turnout of African American voters to the passage of an anti-gay marriage ballot measure in California sparked debates about both black homophobia and gay racism. 158 The complex racial terrain of marital politics in both nations invites serious reflection.
DIFFERENT SLOPES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS
Comparing de jure and de facto responses to same-sex and plural marriage in these two societies offers new perspectives on whether legitimating the former alternative to heterosexual monogamy leads inexorably toward legalizing the latter. The (too) simple verdict is no, "not guilty, as charged." No predestined link and no unidirectional gradient govern relationships between these two forms of marriage in South Africa, the United States, or elsewhere. Their intersecting trails are unpredictable, alternately slippery, and pocked with moguls.
Chronologically, polygamy long predated gay marriage in South Africa and the United States. Thus, one might more credibly claim a slope tilting from plural to same-sex marriage than the other way round. However, few would or, in our view, should make this claim. Historically, polygyny was a pre-modern, patriarchal institution in which kin-based, economic, and procreative priorities govern marital practices. Same-sex marriage, in contrast, expresses a late modern egalitarian conjugal ideal pursued by individuals questing for the emotional and erotic rewards of what Giddens terms "the pure relationship." 159 That is why few could have envisioned that same-sex couples would win legal marriage rights in underdeveloped South Africa long before they are likely to do so in the United States.
South Africa, as we have seen, has a history of racially based marital pluralism. Polygyny and monogamy co-existed under apartheid, but the former, governed by customary law for black Africans only, served to mark their racial inferiority to whites. The post-apartheid regime instituted a fundamental value shift from state-mandated, patriarchal racism to the Constitutional equality principle. Surprisingly, however, marital pluralism remains racially based. Lesbigay family rights were rapidly legalized under the equality clause, but anti-colonial South African homophobia makes it more difficult for black gays and lesbians to exercise them. In contrast, polygynous marriage is legally available almost exclusively to black South Africans.
Nonetheless, the 1998 RCMA represents an attempt to regulate rather than to endorse polygyny. It aims to subject polygyny to the equality clause with which it is fundamentally incompatible. The equality principle made legal same-sex marriage inevitable in South Africa, which in turn reinforces the post-modern trajectory that de-genders the meanings and practices of marriage. The de jure marital slope in South Africa slid swiftly from the equality principle to legal same-sex marriage and then more haltingly to either eroding polygamy or divesting it of patriarchal and racial principles. However, absent substantial interventions into popular support for homophobia and male domination, prospects for realizing egalitarian family ideals promised by the Bill of Rights seem distant and dim.
Historical relationships between plural and same-sex marriage in the United States are nearly the reverse of those in South Africa, and opposite to the slipperyslope argument against gay marriage. Neither plural marriage nor a pluralist definition of marriage ever enjoyed legal status in the United States. Rather, historians have demonstrated that "the deployment of monogamous [heterosexual] conjugal norms" furthered "the imperial consolidation of the nation-state." 160 Demands for plural marriage preceded campaigns for same-sex marriage in the United States, while rationales for criminalizing polygamy supplied ideological foundations for the campaign for gay marriage. In fact, the conservative Christian pro-polygamy movement argues that "Anti-Polygamy is the Real 'Slippery Slope,'" 161 because it abandoned biblical teachings, abrogated religious freedom, and allowed government to define marriage. Thereby, the state attained the power to legalize same-sex marriage when and if it chooses.
We agree that anti-polygamy forces in the United States fueled an ideology that lists toward same-sex marriage, but our reasoning is secular. Manifest destiny, racism, and monogamy intermingled in the nineteenth century as the nation constructed its monolithic marital regime. Expectations that an individual should freely wed a beloved soul-mate gradually supplanted pre-modern marital principles. 162 Feminist critiques of polygyny buttressed ethnocentric convictions that monogamy evinces national and racial superiority. This modern "transformation of intimacy" 163 established ideological grounds for same-sex marriage. Once the marital ideal becomes a freely chosen loving partnership, the state loses rational grounds for dictating the genders of the partners.
De jure responses in South Africa and the United States to postmodern family diversity could scarcely be more antithetical. Vanguard South African law embraces it; reactionary U.S. jurisprudence resists it. South Africa struggles to respect incompatible values among diverse family cultures; the United States seeks to impose monolithic values on all families. De facto support for family diversity in the two nations also contrasts sharply, but with reverse valences. Here the United States occupies pioneer terrain, and South Africa lies closer to the rear. Despite legal and political constraints, U.S. material and cultural conditions allow a hundred species of family to blossom. Despite legal encouragement, South African material and cultural calamities place all but the hardiest, best-cultivated families at risk of withering on the vine.
These contrasts as well as three features common to family politics in both societies are instructive. First, marital projects and family forms are deeply racialized. Civil monogamous (heterosexual) marriage has been disproportionately available to whites in both nations, at some times de jure, at all times de facto. Both nations only recently decriminalized interracial marriage, and whites have been the primary advocates and beneficiaries of gay family rights. Second, gender equality principles conflict with traditional family values in both nations. Finally, although South Africa recognizes multiple types of families, both societies still favor marital over non-marital status.
South African gays did not gain family rights through grassroots activism, but largely by constitutional and judicial fiat. Pivotal gay male anti-apartheid activists in and outside South Africa as well as international human-rights groups in anti-apartheid alliances influenced the momentous inclusion of sex orientation in the equality clause. 164 Therefore, de jure gains for gay rights are symbolically potent but fragile and largely inaccessible to the masses. Substantial cross-racial efforts are needed to counter homophobic, anti-colonial discourses that portray gay as an alien, white Western deformation.
Despite the grassroots, mass-mobilized character of gay activism in the United States, its principal agents and beneficiaries also are white. The singleissue, bourgeois character of the drive for same-sex marriage alienates many members of subordinate racial and ethnic groups, opening opportunities for white religious conservatives to exploit homophobia for political purposes, as Winnie Mandela did in South Africa, and as the campaign for Prop 8 did in California. Many African Americans bitterly reject analogies between U.S. struggles for racial and sexual justice generally and for interracial and gaymarriage rights. 165 Similarly, despite stark demographic contrasts, plural marriage remains racialized in both nations. South African polygyny enjoys at least temporary legal protection as a customary practice among members of the formerly disenfranchised black majority. Conversely, Mormon polygynists in the United States deviated starkly from customary practice among the white Christian majority. Polygyny defied the racist, imperial, but anti-patriarchal family ideology that criminalized it. Contemporary advocates for plural unions in the United States, likewise, are mainly white, and some are overtly racist.
166 South Africa and the United States demonstrate how entrenched race and class inequities thwart the promise of gender and sexual equality. Despite the South African Constitutional mandate of equality, civil marriage remains disproportionately white and customary marriage almost exclusively black African, with women in the most vulnerable positions. U.S. law resists supporting family forms beyond the heterosexual, monogamous marital ideal, thereby withholding legal protection from the majority of American families. Wealthy Americans can contract their relations of care, but poor (mostly minority) Americans, disproportionately women, find their options constricted.
Finally, despite contrasting policies, marriage still enjoys hegemonic status in both societies. The U.S. version is extreme. Federal policies actively promote heterosexual monogamy and discriminate against anyone who is not heterosexual or married. Although the South African Bill of Rights endorses family diversity, unmarried heterosexual couples have not yet won recognition. Forms of legally recognized marriages multiply, but "marriage is the gatekeeper for recognition." 167 Even openly gay High Court Justice Edwin Cameron affirms: "marriage and the capacity to get married remain central to our self-definition as human beings." 168 Thus far we have argued that efforts to suppress polygyny in both societies helped to propel the case for gay marriage and that legal gay marriage, in turn, does more to undermine than to legitimate polygyny. This seems to reverse the slippery-slope argument. However, though our closing argument supports the verdict that gay marriage is not guilty as charged, the defense cannot rest at this point. We do not judge the case so weak that it should be dismissed prima facie. If suppressing polygyny performed historic spade work toward legitimating same-sex unions, legalizing gay marriage now could weaken grounds for ruling egalitarian forms of plural marriage out of court. We do not share the view of pro-polygamy.com that their cause is "the next great civil rights issue." Yet we believe that were there a constituency seeking plural marriages open to consenting adults of any gender, it could plausibly appeal to the same love-based ideology of marriage that serves plaintiffs for same-sex marriage. 169 There are very few such advocates, however, and we do not expect their ranks to increase much in post-industrial democracies.
Most pre-modern marriage systems included polygamy, but its prevalence declines, as recent South African data indicate, along with the economic, cultural, and kinship systems whose purposes it served. Post-modern conditions of intimacy provide few incentives and post-industrial economies scant support for this challenging kinship structure. Were plural marriages legal in the United States, only a small minority of citizens would likely choose to enter them. As New York Times columnist John Tierney observed after viewing Big Love:
After watching the husband on the show struggle to pay for three households and watching his three wives struggle for his attention, the question that comes to mind is not how to keep polygamy illegal. The question is why we bother to ban something that takes so much work these days. 170 Although current prospects for decriminalizing plural unions in the United States seem bleak, perhaps small advocacy groups ultimately will achieve some success. Perhaps they will persuade courts, legislatures, and the populace that a democracy has no more cause to dictate the number of spouses its citizens may wed than it does their religion, their race, or their gender. The South African model suggests potential benefits from such an outcome, even for those who oppose plural marriage. By criminalizing the practice, the United States drove Mormon polygyny underground, enabling sexual and other abuses to flourish unmonitored. "If you outlaw polygamy," one astute commentator observes, "only outlaws will have polygamy." 171 Far wiser to pursue the South African strategy of legally recognizing polygamy in order to regulate abuses and subject its practice to a gender-equality standard. Counter-intuitively, moreover, legalizing plural marriages could lead to fewer rather than more of them. Were ageof-consent laws strictly enforced and women genuinely free to consent to enter polygynous marriages, we doubt that hordes would clamor to do so. That is the wager the South African Law Commission made. Although feminists and the Rural Women's Association sought to ban the practice outright, the commission compromised with patriarchal tribal authorities by recognizing customary marriages while subordinating them to the equality clause. 172 Christian polygynists in the United States correctly distinguish their agenda from polyamory, which subscribes to modern, gender-neutral, egalitarian values. Polyamory, literally many loves, not many spouses, moreover, is less an alternative form of marriage than an alternative to marriage at all. Sequential de facto polyamory is already the norm in contemporary American society, and dishonest forms can claim a long, if dishonorable, pedigree. Since multiple, open, concurrent, amorous commitments are likely to remain at best a marginal preference, we do not believe that courts need to expend energy guarding against demands for their recognition. It would take us considerably beyond our already-lengthy closing argument to enter the contemporary debate on disestablishment of marriage to which such an alternative points. 173 The fate of legal gay or plural marriage or of any state-sponsored marriage will hinge not on abstract logic but on complex social forces and political alliances painstakingly forged or foolishly foresworn. Our comparative analysis reveals the vexed racialized histories that undergird marital regimes in both nations. Intersecting ideologies of racial and religious purity helped generate the modern marital model that both regimes favor. Until groups struggling for racial, sexual, and economic rights collaborate on campaigns for family diversity, few innovations will achieve both de jure and de facto success. The politics of family change is no sleigh ride down a slippery slope. 
